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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies for Pakistan, 
covering its two main dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent 
seeking technologies and in turn covers several social, institutional, political and 
economic aspects. It is also analyzed empirically whether the overall index as well 
as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affects economic 
growth. The results show that over all, institutions promote growth in long run for 
Pakistan. . Therefore for a policy implication, success of any policy could be 
influenced by the soundness of institutions. 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite of the fact the role of institutions in shaping economic history has given significant 
importance but the empirical literature focusing on the concept of institutions is not adequate 
in social sciences 
3
. The contributors to the voluminous descriptive literature on institutions 
are,  Olson (1982), Baumol (1990), North (1990).  They defines institutions as the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, ―the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction‖. These rules of the game can be in the form of formal institutions like laws and 
regulations or informal ones which assimilated to culture or social capital (Tabellini 2005, 
Putnam 1993). Some institutions lowers transaction cost thereby result in innovation and 
productivity whereas other institutional features impedes information flow, raising 
information costs and eroding the gains from information, and  limits the entrepreneurial 
activity. Examples of the institutions that stunt economic growth include government, police, 
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court corruption, excessive taxation and regulation, unstable inconsistent monetary and fiscal 
policy. (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan, Woodruff, 1999, 2000; Gwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson, 1998, 1999; Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1993, 1994; Soto, 1989, 2000).  
The relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic institutions has 
emerged recently as a major subject of interest. The literature shows that the higher the 
quality of domestic institutions the better the effects on the Human development and growth 
of a country. The causality between institutions and economic performance is also important 
issue and studies shows better institutions leads to a higher income rather than causation 
being in the opposite direction. However most of the empirical evidence about the 
relationship between institutions and growth are based on cross-sectional and cross-country 
analysis. Quite apart from general methodological flaws relating to model specification and 
econometric procedure, there are two fundamental limitations that make results from any 
cross-country study on the subject rather dubious. First, cross-country regression analysis is 
based on the implicit assumption of ―homogeneity‖ in the observed relationship across 
countries. This is very restrictive assumption. Secondly, given vast difference among 
countries with respect to nature and quality of data, cross-country comparison is fraught with 
danger. These considerations point a need for undertaking econometric analysis of individual 
countries over time in order to build a sound empirical foundation for informing the policy 
debate. Furthermore, no attempt to our knowledge has yet been made in this direction for 
Pakistan. This paper tries to contribute to the literature in examining the effects of several 
dimensions of institutions on growth empirically for Pakistan. Since many of these 
dimensions are highly correlated, it is impossible to include them all individually in one 
regression. Therefore, the paper develops an index covering its most important aspects. To 
measure these dimensions, 12 variables have been combined to two subindexes using an 
objective statistical method. The sub-indexes are in turn aggregated into one single index of 
institutions. Several other studies attempted to aggregate institutions but this aggregation is 
based on the institutions’ relative importance in economic performance as their authors’ sees 
it, this clearly lacks proper theoretical bases. In this study we tried to aggregate variables to 
judge Pakistan’s institutional quality in a proper theoretical framework.   
We take our queue from theoretical framework set by Douglass North (1981, pp. 20-27). 
Who on explaining the roles of institutions, proposes two theories, a ―Contract theory‖ of the 
state and a ―Predatory theory‖ of the state. Accordingly, in this study, we attempted to 
explore these roles through the notion of institutionalized social technologies. The term 
―social technologies‖ involve patterned human interaction rather than physical engineering, 
also has been put forth by (North and Wallis 1994; Boserup 1996  and Day and Walter 1987).  
Nelson and Sampat (2001)  proposed, not all social technologies are institutions, but rather 
only those that have become a standard and expected thing to do, given the objectives and the 
setting. Institutionalized social technologies define low transaction cost ways of doing things 
that involve human interaction. Hence in effectively institutionalized social technologies, 
individuals capture the social returns to their actions as private returns North and Thomas 
(1973). It protects the output of individual productive units from diversion and also resolves 
the problem of asymmetric information as it develop mutual trust among agents. Whereas 
ineffective institutionalized social technology will not only increase the risk but also divert 
economic agents from innovative activities to seeking rents. Accordingly Our index of 
institutionalized social technologies is divided into Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking 
technologies.   
Paper is organized as follows section 1 introduction, section 2 covers review of literature, 
section 3 covers methodology and rational for index,  section 4 Empirical estimates, Section 5 
Analysis and Results and Section 6 gives conclusions and recommendations. 
  
 
2. Review of Literature 
The Contract theory literature, starting with Coase (1937, 1960) and Williamson (1975, 
1985), links the efficiency of organizations and societies to what type of contracts can be 
written and enforced, and thus underscores the importance of contracting institutions (see 
also Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; and Hart 1995). In contrast, other 
authors advocating predatory theory, emphasize the importance of private property rights, 
especially their protection against expropriation (see, among others, Jones, 1981; De Long 
and Shleifer, 1993, or Olson 2000). Concept of institutions as social technologies is 
consonant with the notion that institutions are ―the rules of the game‖.  Nelson and Sampat 
(2001) proposed that particular social technologies become institutionalized through different 
mechanisms and are sustained through different structures.  Pelikan (2003), Institutionalized 
social technology are those rule routines(technology) that are imposed by society or 
government  through laws, norms, expectations, governing structures and mechanisms, 
customary modes of transacting and interacting,  and converted into rule constraints.  
 Nelson (2007) point out ―Societies clearly have a degree of control over institutions like the 
formal structure of laws, and formal organizational designs and designated authority 
relationships‖.  Baumol (1990) pointed out information asymmetry through rent seeking or 
organized crime is curbed through strong institutions--so only venue left for competition and 
dominance is through innovation. Hence in the setting of effective enforcement, these 
asymmetries will lead to innovation as  the only venue left to earn information rents.  
First component in our index of institutional technologies is Risk reducing technologies. 
Increased risk divert resources from productive activities to protecting there rights.  Hall & 
Jones (1999) showed quantitatively, how important these effects are. Productive activities are 
vulnerable to predation. As they put it, Social control of diversion has two benefits. First, in a 
society free of diversion, productive units are rewarded by the full amount of their 
production, and where there is diversion, on the other hand, it acts like a tax on output. 
Second, where social control of diversion is effective, individual units do not need to invest 
resources in avoiding diversion. In many cases, social control is much cheaper than private 
avoidance. Social control act as a threat of punishment, which itself is free and the only 
resources required are those needed to make this threat credible. In other word social control 
does not means collectively hiring guards by society proves to be cheaper. Magee, Brock and 
Young (1989) and Murphy Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explain how inadequate controls 
affect growth.  
Second and perhaps more important measure of institutional quality is index of anti-rent 
seeking technologies. As shown earlier, the rent-seeking (behaviour) refers to ―the socially 
costly pursuit of wealth transfers‖ (Tollison, 1997). In other words, rent-seeking is 
manifested when the bottom-line of its social consequences is negative. 
Mehlum et al.(2003) explains the notion of destructive creations asserts that it all starts from 
the breakdown of institutions, generating new opportunities of extracting rents without 
producing. A vast literature can be found linking entrepreneurship, rent seeking and growth 
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Baumol, 1990, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995;  Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 1998 ). 
There is dearth of literature exploring relationship between institution and economic 
performance. In particular (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 2005) show that quality of 
institutions have a more important effect on long term growth than on short term one. Jalilian 
et al. (2007) emphasises the role of regulatory institutional capacity in accounting for cross-
country variations in economic growth Méon and Weill (2006) , Olson et al. (1998) find 
evidence suggesting that institutional factors are strongly related to total factor productivity. 
As productivity growth is higher in countries with better institutions and quality of 
governance.  
 With regards to causal effect  between institutions and economic performance , studies like 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Olson et al. 1998; Rodrik et al. 2004; Kauffman et 
al. 2005, p. 38), indicates indicate that a better institutions leads to a higher income rather 
than causation being in the opposite direction. In particular Kauffman suggests that a one 
standard deviation improvement in governance institutions leads to a two to threefold 
difference in income levels in the long run. 
Acemogu and Johnson (2005) who attempted to distinguish between anti-rent seeking 
institutions and risk-reducing institutions, as they termed them as ―property rights‖ and 
―contracting‖ institutions respectively. They found strong support for the importance of anti-
rent seeking institutions on economic outcome but In contrast, indicate that the role of risk 
reducing institutions is more limited.  The reason they give to this fact is, in absence of 
formal risk reducing institutions – contracting institutions, the gap is filled by private 
alternative institutional arrangement. Like in earlier times when formal institutions of courts 
and police don’t exist or ineffective, people then resort to dwell in groups where contracts are 
honoured through informal pressure and risk of expulsion from group. Hence their rights are 
secured in other ways. In contrast, protection from rent seeking behaviour relates to the 
relationship between the state and the citizens. When the state have major problems of 
corruption, inefficiency or no checks on the state, on politicians, and on elites, individuals 
don’t have a level playing fields and adds to uncertainty. In this case, they are also unable to 
enter into private arrangements to circumvent these problems. In regional context, Fernandes 
and Kraay (2007) employing firm level data found the similar evidence that firms in the 
South Asian countries are able to circumvent failures in formal "contracting institutions", by 
resorting frequently to informal channels such as belonging to a business association. 
Some studies find that the quality of governance and institutions is important in explaining 
the rates of investment, as they suggested they effect economic performance through 
improving the climate for capital creation (Kirkpatrick, Parker, & Zhang 2006; World Bank, 
2003). Other studies reiterated institutional roles in improving international capital flows in 
particular FDI (Reisen and De Soto 2001; Smarzynska and Wei 2000). And portfolio 
investment Gelos and Wei (2002) 
A number of studies have made attempts to examine institutions  in Pakistan as well in south 
Asian region. Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (1999), Ahmed (2001)  illustrated 
that  institutions appears to be a significant problem in South Asia. Specially in Pakistan, 
institutional decay has led to poor 
governance, which has resulted in ad hoc policy-making. Instability and unpredictability 
has discouraged long-term investment and encouraged lobbying, corruption, 
and misuse of power, resulting in frustration and dysfunctional behaviour [For 
details, see DRI/McGraw-Hill (1998)]. [Hussain (1999)]. Asserts weak institutions have been 
used by èlite to extract rents in Pakistan.  Institutional impact on poverty is explored in 
Pakistan (1999), Hassan (2002) Haq and Zia (2009), which shows institutions are negatively 
and significantly correlated with poverty, hence weak institutions to increase in poverty in 
Pakistan. However  in contrast to the popular notion, Studies like Shafique and Haq (2006) 
based on world bank’s governance indicators, find weak institutions do improve welfare of 
the society but it has negative influence on GDP growth rate. At another place, Fernandes and 
Kraay (2007) and Easterly (2003) in a study suggest that Pakistan have per capita incomes 
that are considerably higher than their very weak institutional performance would suggest 
based on average cross-country relationships. The similar assessment in the context of 
political institutions in made by SPDC (2000), which shows that while governments under 
authoritarian rule in Pakistan were good for economic growth, they were not necessarily as 
successful in improving human endowment. Authoritarian rule normally associated of weak 
institutions whereas vice versa for democracy. 
3. Methodology and Rational of index. 
In this section we focus on index description, data sources, Normalization procedure and 
lastly weighting and aggregation methodology. 
3.1 Description of Indices 
In this section we define the computation of the following indices.  
Index of institutionalized Social Technologies  (sci) 
Technologies consist of those factors that increase efficiency and productivity. This index 
measures technologies that are bundle of information that consists of routines and processes 
imposed by society, which creates positive rents in the economy. These rents are pareto 
improving and results in Schumpeterian creative destruction, whereas improperly enforced 
institutional technology creates negative rents doesn’t result in increasing return to scale at 
economy level, but results in mere redistribution of wealth within the economy creating 
inequality.  This is an aggregate cross national index that encompasses the impact of all 
institutional performance indicators and comprises of Index of Risk Reducing Technologies 
and the Index of Anti Rent seeking Technologies. (See Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Components of Index of Institutionalized Social Technology (IIST) 
A Ri Index of Anti Rent Seeking Technology 0.5 
  1 RiB Bureaucracy Quality 0.18 
  2 RicC Corruption 0.07 
  3 RpA Democratic Accountability 0.16 
  4 RpP1 executive recruitment 0.15 
  5 RpP2 political compitetion 0.16 
  6 RpR political rights 0.11 
  7 RpV civil liberties 0.17 
B Sii Index of Risk Reducing Technologies 0.5 
  1 SicC1 Investment Profile 0.26 
  2 SilL1 Law and Order 0.17 
  3 SilL2 
Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and 
Disappearance indicators 0.16 
  4 SisG Government Stability 0.23 
  5 SisB executive constraints 0.18 
1. Index of Risk reducing Technologies (Sii) 
First component of institutionalized social technology is called risk reducing technology. It 
measures institutional arrangements that reduce transactional risk. Risk is an important 
component of business decisions which requires long term transactions, which require 
transactional trust. Well enforced Risk reducing technologies strengthen this transactional 
trust. The absence of transactional trust advantages individuals who can overcome the 
resulting institutional deficiencies. For example, a biased or ineffective justice system makes 
property rights insecure for all except those who have power to secure it privately. As a result 
returns to investment for those people would be considerably more than the rest who bears 
higher risk due to insecurity. As a result it will divert individuals and businesses from 
innovative activities to become predictive rent seekers.  
Moreover increased risk diverts resources from productive activities to protecting their rights. 
As a result it lowers productivity.  Rephrasing a bookish example, if a farm cannot be 
protected from theft, then thievery will be an attractive alternative to farming. A fraction of 
the labor force will be employed as thieves, making no contribution to output. Farmers will 
spend more of their time and resources protecting their farms from thieves like they must hire 
guards and put up fences and consequently grow fewer crops from available resources. In 
short Risk Reducing technology removes information asymmetry, creates mutual trust and 
hence decreases the risk of creating long term business relationships. This intern increase 
productivity and growth.  
Index of risk reducing technologies is aggregate form of following variables 
1) Investment profile majoring Contract Viability/Expropriation,Profits Repatriation, 
Payment Delays 2) Law and Order 3) Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, 
and Disappearance indicators 4) Government Stability and 5) executive constraints. There 
weights in risk reducing technology index are 26%, 17%, 16%, 23%, and 18% respectively. 
2. Index of Anti-Rent seeking Technologies (Ri) 
Predatory rents can be gained through weak institutionalization of risk reducing technologies 
as explained earlier. However this component exclusively focuses on those rents seeking 
opportunities that arise due to loopholes in ineffective or week institutions. Rent-seeking is 
defined as a situation in which an individual or firm makes money by manipulating economic 
environment rather than by profit making through innovation. Gaps in institutions create rents 
for controlling agents betting them higher return then though innovation hence society moves 
from innovative to rent seeking activities. Rent extraction is a strategic substitute for 
productive activities as  improved opportunities of rent extraction leads to higher profits to 
parasites on the expense of the producers, in short run it will hampers productive investments 
but in the longer run the profit differential induces a reallocation of entrepreneurs away from 
production. As production declines and congestion among parasites sets in, both parasites and 
producers lose profits Usher (1987).  In other words while more efficient producers raise 
income both for producers and parasites, more efficient parasites lower the income for both. 
In short rent seeking does produce rents for predicators but there impact in economy is zero 
or negative, since resources are not used in increasing the size of the economic pie, but 
diverted to snatching the bigger piece from others.  Specifically, this index focuses on 
technologies which helps eliminate three kinds of rent. Accordingly it is subdivided into the 
following components. 1) Bureaucracy Quality 2) Corruption 3) Democratic Accountability 
4) executive recruitment 5) Political competition 6) Political rights and 7) civil liberties. Their 
weights in Index are 18%, 7%, 16%, 15%, 16%, 11%, 17% respectively. 
Description of  index of institutionalized social technology and its subcomponents are 
provided in table 1.  
 
 
3.2 Data Sources and Description 
Variables used in construction of indices are taken from various data sources. Most 
prominent is Political risk service’s international country risk guide. Since January 1984, the 
ICRG has been compiling economic, financial, political and composite risk ratings for 90 
countries on a monthly basis. The ICRG rating system comprises 22 variables, representing 
three major components of country risk, namely economic, financial and political. We 
included 6 variables mostly measuring political risk in creation of our index. As this data is 
on monthly basis, we use 12 month average to convert to annual frequency. Three variables 
of political nature is taken from POLITY 4 project managed by Center for Systemic Peace. 
Its data is of annual frequency available since 1975 and has become the most widely used 
data resource for studying regime change and the effects of regime authority. Data of political 
rights and civil liberties are taken from Freedom of the world index, published by Freedom 
house published annually since 1955. The variable of Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political 
Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators is taken from Physical integrity index composed 
by Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset containing human rights data for 195 
countries, annually from 1981. Description of variables used in index are included in table 2  
whereas their details are given in Appendix 1.   
  
Table 2 
Index Composition and Data description 
 
Name Abbreviation Parent index 
Theoretical 
Ranges Source Type 
Bureaucracy 
Quality RiB 
Index of Anti 
Rent Seeking 
Technology ri 
1-4+  International Country Risk 
Guide(ICRG) -Political Risk 
Services(PRS),Newyork 
<www.prsgroup.com> 
Expert assessments 
subject to peer review at 
the topic and regional 
levels 
Corruption RicC 1-6+ 
Democratic 
Accountability RpA 1-6+ 
executive 
recruitment RpP1 1-8-+ 
Marshall Monty G., Jaggers Keith." 
POLITY IV PROJECT",Center for 
Systemic Peace, 
<www.systemicpeace.org/polity> 
  
political 
competition RpP2 1-10-+   
political rights RpR 1-7-- Freedom in the World (various editions) 
,Freedom House,New York  
<http://www.freedomhouse> 
  
civil liberties RpV 1-7--   
Investment 
Profile SicC1 
Index of Risk 
Reducing 
Technologies-
sii 
1-12+  International Country Risk 
Guide(ICRG) -Political Risk 
Services(PRS),Newyork 
<www.prsgroup.com> 
Expert assessments 
subject to peer review at 
the topic and regional 
levels 
Law and Order SilL1 1-6+ 
Governme/nt 
Stability SisG 1-12+ 
Torture, 
Extrajudicial 
Killing, Political 
Imprisonment, 
and 
Disappearance 
indicators SilL2 0-8-+ 
 CINGRANELLI DAVID L.,  RICHARDS 
DAVID L.,THE CIINGRANELLII-
RIICHARDS (CIIRII) HUMAN RIIGHTS 
DATA PROJECT 
<http://www.humanrightsdata.org/>   
executive 
constraints SisB 1-7-+ 
Marshall Monty G., Jaggers Keith." 
POLITY IV PROJECT",Center for 
Systemic Peace, 
<www.systemicpeace.org/polity>   
 
  
3.3 Normalization Procedure 
Because of different measuring scales used in different variables, to include them in index, 
we use normalization treatment thereby converting each variable to an index with a zero to 
one scale, where higher values denote more strong institutions. When higher values of the 
original variable indicate weak institutions (like country ranks), the formula (Vmax-
Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin) is used for transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicate strong 
institutions, the formula (Vi-Vmin)/(Vmax- Vmin) is used. Here Vi=original values, Vmax = 
Maximum value attained by country in original index, Vmin = Minimum value attained by 
country in original index. Similar strategy is being employed in creation of various indices 
notably Gwartney and Lawson (2008), Miller and Holmes (2009) and Schwab and Porter 
(2008). Descriptive statistics of these variable is provides in Table 3 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of variables used in index 
 
Variables 
Abb. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
RiB 0.95652 0.20851 
RicC 0.47464 0.22074 
RpA 0.39529 0.25862 
RpP1 0.43478 0.43444 
RpP2 0.55797 0.43406 
RpR 0.58696 0.34219 
RpV 0.10870 0.29987 
SicC1 0.47467 0.22523 
SilL1 0.51742 0.26748 
SilL2 0.44348 0.25553 
SisG 0.60039 0.28968 
SisB 0.54348 0.42999 
 
 
3.4 Weighting and Aggregation methodology. 
 
Principal component analysis is used to determine the weight given to each component in the 
construction of the index. This procedure partitions the variance of a set of variables and uses 
it to determine the linear combination—the weights— of these variables that maximizes the 
variation of the newly constructed principal component. In effect, the newly constructed 
principal component is the variable that captures the variation of the underlying components 
most fully. It is an objective method of combining a set of variables into a single variable that 
best reflects the original data. As Gwartney and Lawson (2001: 7) point out, this procedure is 
particularly appropriate when several sub-components measure different aspects of a 
principal component. The component weights derived by this procedure are shown in 
parentheses in Figure 1. The same procedure was also used to derive the weights for the sub 
indices that are used  in the construction of main indices referred in Figure1. 
More specifically first, principal components analysis is used to extract factors (Manly, 
1994). We choose factors that fulfil these considerations: (i) have associated eigenvalues 
larger than one; (ii) contribute individually to the explanation of overall variance by more 
than 10%; and (iii) contribute cumulatively to the explanation of the overall variance by more 
than 60%. Details of extracted factors are provided in table 4. These factors are then rotated 
in order to minimise the number of individual indicators that have a high loading on the same 
factor. The idea behind transforming the factorial axes is to obtain a ―simpler structure‖ of the 
factors. Rotation is a standard step in factor analysis – it changes the factor loadings and 
hence the interpretation of the factors, while leaving unchanged the analytical solutions 
obtained ex-ante and ex-post the rotation. Weights are then calculated through the square of 
factor loadings after rotation which represents the proportion of the total unit variance of the 
indicator which is explained by the factor. Similar approach is used by Nicoletti et al., (2000) 
that is of grouping the individual components with the highest factors loadings into 
intermediate Factor. These Factors aggregated by assigning a weight to each one of them 
equal to the proportion of the explained variance in the data set. The components of extracted 
and rotated factors along with component weights are given in table 5.  
 
 
Table 4 
Factor Extraction and Rotation based on Principal Component Analysis 
S. N0. Indices 
Extracted 
Factors 
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
 
Eigen values % of Variance Cumulative % Eigen values % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 Ri 
1 3.967145474 56.67350678 56.67350678 3.31815758 47.40225114 47.40225114 
2 1.182852284 16.89788977 73.57139654 1.384364119 19.77663027 67.17888141 
3 0.931173398 13.30247712 86.87387366 1.378649458 19.69499225 86.87387366 
2 sii 
1 2.608787128 52.17574257 52.17574257 2.49698881 49.9397762 49.9397762 
2 1.057745676 21.15491353 73.33065609 1.169543995 23.39087989 73.33065609 
3 iist 1 1.448818986 72.44094932 72.44094932 
   
 
  
Table 5 
Extracted Factor loadings and weights 
 
S. 
N0. 
Indices 
Components Rotated Factor loadings Squared Factor loadings 
Squared Factor loadings 
(Scaled to unity) 
Weights 
Weights 
(Scaled 
to 
unity) 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
  
1 Ri 
RiB 0.0873 0.1153 0.9560 0.0076 0.0133 0.9140 0.0023 0.0096 0.6630 0.1503 0.18 
RicC 0.6012 -0.1958 0.5878 0.3614 0.0383 0.3455 0.1089 0.0277 0.2506 0.0568 0.07 
RpA 0.9045 -0.2039 0.0882 0.8181 0.0416 0.0078 0.2465 0.0300 0.0056 0.1345 0.16 
RpP1 -0.8848 -0.3695 -0.1316 0.7829 0.1365 0.0173 0.2359 0.0986 0.0126 0.1287 0.16 
RpP2 0.8873 0.3498 0.1517 0.7873 0.1223 0.0230 0.2373 0.0884 0.0167 0.1295 0.16 
RpR 0.7389 0.4392 0.2661 0.5459 0.1929 0.0708 0.1645 0.1393 0.0514 0.0898 0.11 
RpV 0.1219 0.9162 0.0165 0.0149 0.8394 0.0003 0.0045 0.6063 0.0002 0.1380 0.17 
Sum 
   
3.3182 1.3844 1.3786 
   
0.8277 
 weights 
   
0.5456 0.2276 0.2267 
     
2 sii 
SicC1 -0.0155 0.9332 
 
0.0002 0.8709 
 
0.0001 0.7446 
 
0.2375 0.26 
SilL1 0.7634 0.4543 
 
0.5827 0.2064 
 
0.2334 0.1765 
 
0.1589 0.17 
SilL2 -0.7357 0.1060 
 
0.5413 0.0112 
 
0.2168 0.0096 
 
0.1476 0.16 
SisG 0.8817 0.2626 
 
0.7775 0.0690 
 
0.3114 0.0590 
 
0.2120 0.23 
SisB -0.7715 0.1099 
 
0.5952 0.0121 
 
0.2384 0.0103 
 
0.1623 0.18 
Sum 
   
2.4970 1.1695 
    
0.9185 
 weights 
   
0.6810 0.3190 
      
3 iist 
ri 0.8511 
  
0.7244 
     
0.5000 
 sii 0.8511 
  
0.7244 
     
0.5000 
 weights 
   
1.4488 
        
 
For Aggregation, we employ linear aggregation which is the summation of weighted and 
normalised individual indicators. Table 6 shows the results for the index of institutionalized 
social technologies as well as its sub indices of Pakistan for the period 1984 to 2006. 
  
Table 6 
The Index of Institutionalized Social Technology and its sub indices 
 
Obs. IIST 
IIST 
RI SII 
1984 0.2741 0.1820 0.3662 
1985 0.5128 0.4687 0.5569 
1986 0.5330 0.4980 0.5679 
1987 0.5081 0.5007 0.5154 
1988 0.6487 0.7190 0.5785 
1989 0.6112 0.7190 0.5034 
1990 0.4609 0.6065 0.3152 
1991 0.4524 0.5215 0.3833 
1992 0.4906 0.5215 0.4597 
1993 0.4969 0.5490 0.4448 
1994 0.5920 0.5970 0.5870 
1995 0.5951 0.6130 0.5772 
1996 0.6678 0.5935 0.7421 
1997 0.7395 0.6496 0.8294 
1998 0.6476 0.5885 0.7067 
1999 0.4658 0.4972 0.4345 
2000 0.3989 0.4192 0.3786 
2001 0.4535 0.4163 0.4908 
2002 0.4601 0.3975 0.5226 
2003 0.4273 0.3962 0.4585 
2004 0.4204 0.3962 0.4447 
2005 0.4420 0.3962 0.4879 
2006 0.4822 0.3962 0.5683 
 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
The aim of the empirical section of the paper is to investigate links between nations’ 
institutional quality and economic growth, using OLS as well as GMM instrumental variable 
estimation method in order to control for endogeneity. This subsection describes data, the 
regression specifications and methodology. 
4.1 Data Description 
The dependent variable is the  Real GDP per capita in real term. There are two sets of 
independent variables. First is the institutional variables and send is control variables. We 
take index of institutionalized social technology, as well as its sub indices of Risk reducing 
technologies and Anti-rent seeking technologies for measurement of institutional quality. 
 Dependent and control variable such as total trade are taken from Heston and Summers 
(2009) whereas other control variables such as Gross domestic savings and Inflation, are 
taken from World Development Indicators. Table 7 gives detailed information about the 
variables and their data source. 
Table 7 
Estimation Variables' Data Sources and Description 
 
  
Variable 
Name Description   Source 
1 RGDPPC Real GDP per capita at constant price (Laspeyres) 
initial 
Factor 
Heston and Summers 
(2009) 
2 SAVGD Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)  Savings 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
3 INFCPI Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  
Macro-
economic 
Stability 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
4 OPEN 
Total trade (Exports plus Imports) as a percentage of GDP. 
(export, import  and GDP figures are expressed in real 
values) Openness 
Heston and Summers 
(2009) 
5 IIST Index Institutionalized Social Technologies Institutions 
Authors' own 
calculations 
6 Sii Aggregate Index of Risk reducing Technologies Institutions 
Authors' own 
calculations 
7 Ri Index of Anti-Rent seeking Technologies Institutions 
Authors' own 
calculations 
 
 
4.2 Regression Specification   
The role of institutions quality in economic performance, is explained by north in ―contract 
theory‖ and a ―predatory theory‖ of the state. To assess these roles we used standard growth 
regression framework which mostly follow growth empirics literature, such as (Barro 1991; 
Mankiw et al. 1992; and Leving and Renelt 1992).  
Yt = β0 + β1It + β2Xt + єi 
where t is time period  єt is the error term. The economic growth yt  is measured by GDP per 
capita in real terms, It stands for institutional variables, whereas Xt is the vector of control 
variables for other determinants of growth.  
Other determinants of growth denoted by Xt include variables to control for other factors that 
influence growth. In most empirical studies, the choices of additional control variables are ad 
hoc across studies.  As one example, the data appendix in Levine and Renelt (1992) lists over 
50 possibilities. In our study, we will be using variables pertaining to macroeconomic 
stability, savings and Openness.  Macroeconomic stability factor in growth empirics is 
normally captured by consumer price inflation. It is expected that higher inflation tends to 
reduce growth due to a high level of price instability hence could have a negative expected 
sign. As Kormendi and  Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) find that inflation are 
negatively related to growth.  Saving represented by gross domestic saving as % of GDP, is 
considered a crucial variable of growth equation. With positive expected sign, higher saving 
leads to higher investment which in turn leads to higher economic growth. The presumption 
is that higher saving precedes economic growth. In a typical model of economic growth such 
as the Solow (1956) model, a clear connection is made between saving and economic growth. 
Romer (1987,1989) suggests that saving has too large an influence on growth and take this to 
be evidence for positive  externalities from capital accumulation. On the empirical fount, 
(Modigliani 1970, 1990; Maddison 1992; and Carroll and Weil 1994) prove robust positive 
correlation between saving and growth.  Another important variable included in our model is 
trade liberalization. Removal of trade restrictions helps to stabilize the development process 
by improving efficiency and return economies from distorted factor prices to production 
frontiers. Moreover, trade openness will improve domestic technology, production process 
will be more efficient, and hence productivity will rise (Jin, 2000). Trade liberalization and 
growth relations may occur through investment, and trade openness may provide greater 
access to investment goods (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Countries that liberalize their external 
sector and reduce impediments to international trade can experience relatively higher 
economic growth. It is generally agreed that an open trade regime is crucial for economic 
growth and development (Sukar and Ramakrishna, 2002). Desceibtive Statistics of variables 
used in empirical analysis are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
RGDPPC IIST RI SII WSAVGD WINFCPI OPEN 
 Mean 2619.487 0.5122 0.5062 0.5182 13.7610 7.4730 30.0948 
 Median 2632.580 0.4906 0.5007 0.5034 14.6839 7.8443 29.5600 
 Maximum 3388.570 0.7395 0.7190 0.8294 17.6117 12.3682 38.6100 
 Minimum 2058.170 0.2741 0.1820 0.3152 5.9293 2.9141 26.3000 
 Std. Dev. 335.2862 0.1050 0.1243 0.1224 3.5298 3.1318 3.1742 
 Skewness 0.5038 0.2035 -0.3773 0.7651 -0.8793 0.0319 1.1306 
 Kurtosis 3.0544 3.0077 3.3453 3.4498 2.6478 1.7241 3.8064 
 Jarque-Bera 0.9759 0.1589 0.6599 2.4378 3.0824 1.5639 5.5235 
 Probability 0.6139 0.9236 0.7189 0.2955 0.2141 0.4575 0.0632 
 Sum 60248.1900 11.7809 11.6422 11.9197 316.5022 171.8781 692.1800 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2473170 0.2426 0.3401 0.3296 274.1078 215.7741 221.6568 
 Observations 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 
 
 
4.3 Estimation Methodology 
We will be using OLS as well as GMM procedure in our analysis as there might be the 
problem of endogenity that could arise in independent variables specifically in institutional 
variables, as these variables have a strong positive correlation with growth. In literature, 
depending on the context, GMM has been applied to time series, cross-sectional, and panel 
data. Inevitably, GMM builds from earlier work, and its most obvious statistical antecedents 
are method of moments (Pearson, 1893, 1895) and instrumental variables estimation ( 
Reiersol 1941; Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982). The starting point of GMM estimation is a 
theoretical relation that the parameters should satisfy that is to choose the parameter estimates 
so that the theoretical relation is satisfied as ―closely‖ as possible. The GMM is a robust 
estimator in that, unlike maximum likelihood estimation, it does not require information of 
the exact distribution of the disturbances. The theoretical relation that the parameters should 
satisfy are usually orthogonality conditions between some (possibly nonlinear) function of 
the parameters  ƒ(θ)  and a set of instrumental variables  zt:  
E (ƒ(θ)’Z) = 0 
Where  θ  are the parameters to be estimated. The GMM estimator selects parameter 
estimates so that the sample correlations between the instruments and the function ƒ are as 
close to zero as possible, as defined by the criterion function: 
J(θ) = (m(θ))’ Am(θ) 
Where  m(θ)= ƒ(θ)’Z  and  A  is a weighting matrix. Any symmetric positive definite matrix 
A will yield a consistent estimate of  q . However, it can be shown that a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition to obtain an (asymptotically) efficient estimate is to set A  equal to the 
inverse of the covariance matrix of the sample moments  m . 
To apply this methodology, the following equation is estimated by GMM: 
Δyi = β0 + β1Ii + β2Xi + єi 
The instrumental variables for the equation are twice lags of dependent variable and first lag 
of all explanatory variables. 
 
  
5. Results and Analysis 
Table 9 
Average Periodic Trend 
 
Period RGDPPC IIST RI SII SAVGD INFCPI OPEN 
1984-87 2163.990 0.457 0.412 0.502 8.005 4.972 26.793 
1988-91 2418.430 0.543 0.642 0.445 12.387 9.381 29.273 
1992-95 2574.730 0.544 0.570 0.517 16.092 11.049 30.325 
1996-99 2680.893 0.630 0.582 0.678 14.581 8.030 28.135 
2000-03 2788.538 0.435 0.407 0.463 16.442 3.430 31.013 
2004-06 3247.290 0.448 0.396 0.500 15.492 8.143 36.677 
 
Table 1 focuses on periodic trends in institutional quality and growth. Over all institutional 
indicators fairly remain stable. They witness stable increase in periods of 1984 to 1999. 
Especially 1996-99 periods witnessed sharp increase in institutional quality. But afterwards, 
institutional index saw a sharp decline but again saw some improvements in later periods. On 
the political front, democratic era of 1988 to1999 saw a considerably higher institutional 
quality index then era govern by military dictatorships. Era of Transition to civilian 
democracy in 1988 witnessed sharp increase of about 19% in institutional quality especially 
anti-rent seeking technologies increases by about 55%, while Era followed by military 
takeover after 1999 saw a sharp decline of about 31% in institutional quality. This trend can 
also be witnessed from Figure 1. Hence strong political institutions do produce a huge impact 
of other social institutions in the country and reforming and strengthening the political 
institutions become pivotal in economic and social development. On the other hand, growth 
in economy measured by real GDP per capita, witnessed a stable increase over the years. 
However, comparatively higher growth was witnessed in era of 1984- 91. In era of 90s, 
income level became fairly stable, and it sharply picked up later in 2000-06 period (Figure 2). 
Among other variables, savings remain fairly stable at about 15%. Inflation followed income, 
remained started a bit higher, remains lower throughout the middle are witnessed a surge in 
2003 onwards as economic witnessed a shape growth. Trade openness also witnessed a stable 
increase and picked up momentum after 2002 as policies towards liberalization took their 
ground. 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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 There are quit a few studies that found inverse link between institution and GDP growth. In a 
simulation to investigate this link, we regress GDP growth with our index, we found negative 
significent sign for institutions backing the previous studies, then we employ regression using  
GDP per capita as a proxy of growth,   In our estimation procedure, we employ both OLS and 
GMM methodology. The estimation results clearly indicate a robust positive impact of 
institutional variables on growth (Table 10) 
 
Table 10 
Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: RGDPPC 
Variable OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
C -482.0337 -343.0652 -116.5476 -2400.519 -1321.135 -851.174 
  -1.129771 -0.968838 -0.249137 (-3.004094)*** (-3.148513)*** -1.566939 
IIST 806.8443     2853.558     
  (2.114754)**     (3.114908)***     
Sii   685.3715     1675.579   
    (2.536967)**     (5.246994)***   
Ri     296.3029     196.6219 
      0.775096     0.47228 
SAVGD 28.39167 29.95536 30.15453 37.27116 40.18182 17.07292 
  (2.562602)** (2.843858)** (2.46218)** (2.091764)* (2.923394)*** 1.292803 
INFCPI -28.68049 -22.73401 -21.85992 -71.26568 -42.7683 -23.85208 
  (-2.31649)** (-2.143448)** -1.509949 (-3.492693)*** (-3.107275)*** -1.287906 
OPEN 83.46544 78.58621 77.57006 118.2423 93.81972 108.6565 
  (6.279713)*** (6.591241)*** (5.119038)*** (5.919254)*** (7.703166)*** 5.665894 
R-squared 0.8307 0.844307 0.795464 0.667138 0.678589 0.661355 
Adjusted R-sq. 0.793078 0.809709 0.750011 0.588817 0.602963 0.581673 
S.E. of regression 152.5172 146.2597 167.6394 204.8789 201.3237 206.651 
DW stat 1.462563 1.678548 1.100245 1.999214 1.834138 1.21778 
Sum squared resid 418707.1 385054.2 505853.3 713581 689031.1 725978.5 
J-statistic       0.052536 0.02859 0.082943 
 
First three models are tested on OLS. all variable have expected signs and are highly 
significant. Inflation measure having expected negative sign and significant suggests that 
unstable macro economic conditions have a negative effect on economic growth. Hence 
pursuing policies of inflation financed growth might not be fruitful in long run. Coefficient of 
savings also remains positive in all three models and significant clearly showing saving is 
instrumental to growth as it increases capital accumulation and investments. The coefficient 
of openness represented by trade to GDP having expected positive sign and highly significant 
in all three models, showing increased trade liberalization impact growth in a positive way.  
In model 1, Our main institutional variable is tested. its coefficients is significant and positive 
indicate institutional quality positively and significantly influence growth. We also produce 
result of  two subindices of index of index of institutionalized social technologies, namely 
risk reducing technologies in model 2 and anti-rent seeking technologies in model 3. All 
except anti-rent seeking index remains positive and significant. This show antirent seeking 
technologies although important, does not produce impact on growth alone, but when 
combined into aggregate index. 
With some of the variables, there is an obvious endogeneity problem: previous research 
has shown, that, e.g., if saving increase, it will increase investment and leads to growth, hence 
it might be endogenous. The same is true for other variables. Endogeneity might even be a 
problem for our index. To encounter this problem these models are regressed based on GMM 
methodology.  For this, First and Second lags of dependent variable and first lag of all 
independent variables are used as instruments. In model 4 to 6, Confirming 
the OLS results, the overall index of institutions and risk reducing index seems to 
significantly influence growth. there significant level also increased. The signs of other 
variable also remain same however they became even more significant. Overall the result 
remains unchanged. 
Summing up, the overall index of institutionalized social technologies, have a significant 
(positive) influence on growth. The similar result witnessed in one of its sub index namely 
risk reducing technologies. However anti-rent seeking technologies remained insignificant. 
These institutional indices are also comparable as they all have similar range between 0 and 
1. The highest coefficient on our main index clearly depict that both sub indices alone cannot 
produce as much influence on growth as when they are combined. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The results suggest a strong link between institutional quality and economic growth for 
Pakistan. All three measures of institutional quality significantly and positively affect growth. 
Moreover our analysis  indicate that between the two forms of institutions measured as a sub- 
indices of institutionalized social technologies, Risk reducing technologies impact growth 
considerable more than the Anti-rent seeking technologies. The other control variables shows 
macroeconomic stability, savings and openness also have significant impact as predicted by 
theory. On policy front, developing county such as Pakistan or any other country for that 
matter must make and strengthen their instructions in order to achieve sustainable 
development. In its absence, even best policies for development and attracting investment 
might fail as no incentive can balance the huge business risk that could arise if property rights 
are not secured and contract enforcement is week. Also menses of corruption and nepotism 
divert any policy incentives given to entrepreneurs towards rent seekers making economy 
stuck in structural rigidities making any policy ineffective.  
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